

CISEPS Seminar

Higher Intelligence Groups Have Higher Cooperation Rates in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma

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Abstract

Intelligence affects social outcomes of groups, beyond its obvious influence on the productivity of each individual in the group. This relation is important, large, but not understood. A systematic study of the link is provided here with an experimental design where two groups of subjects with different levels of intelligence play a repeated prisoner's dilemma. Behavior varies substantially between the two groups. The initial cooperation rates are similar, but groups with higher intelligence develop over time a steadily larger cooperation, and earn a larger total payment. The difference is produced by the cumulation of small but persistent differences in the response to past cooperation of the partner. Cooperation of higher intelligence subjects is payoff sensitive, thus not automatic: in the same design with lower continuation probability there is no difference between different intelligence groups. Intelligence appears as the determinant factor, once personality and education are taken into account.

CISEPS

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