On the Transmission of Guilt Aversion and the Evolution of Trust
The DEMS Economics Seminar series is proud to host
Fabrizio Panebianco
(Università Cattolica)
with S. Della Lena and E. Manzoni
ABSTRACT
This paper studies the evolution of trust and trustworthiness modeling the intergenerational transmission of guilt aversion. Results depend both on features of strategic interaction and of parental transmission. We show that if there is complete information of opponents’ traits, independently of parenting style, the share of high-guilt agents in society weakly increases over time and trust and trustworthiness are maximized. Moreover, when traits are not observable, different levels of guilt always coexist and trust and trustworthiness might also increase when parents have imperfect empathy in the transmission of traits or if there is homophily in society.
The seminar will in presence, DEMS Seminar Room 2104, Building U7-2nd floor