Protection for Whom? The Political Economy of Protective Labor Laws for Women
The DEMS Economics Seminar series is proud to host
Matthias Doepke
(London School of Economics and Northwestern University)
with H. Foerster, A. Hannusch and M. Tertilt
ABSTRACT
During the first half of the 20th century, many U.S. states enacted laws restricting women's labor market opportunities, including maximumhours and minimum wage laws, seating laws, night-shift bans, and limits on the weight women were allowed to lift. These so-called protective labor laws effectively ended in the 1960s, following the Civil Rights Act of 1964. We investigate the political economy behind the rise and decline of these laws. In our model, households either support protective laws with the goal of curbing labor market competition from women, or oppose protective legislation as they benefit from women's labor income or from relative price decreases realized due to women's labor productivity. Individuals' voting behavior depends on their household composition, labor supply, and the sector they work in. Voting evolves as the economy transitions from agricultural production, where male and female workers are complements, to modern production, where men and women compete. We leverage cross-state variation in the timing of protective legislation to demonstrate empirically that protective laws are enacted when our theory predicts majority support, and expire when support vanishes according to our theory. Counterfactual simulations based on a model calibration show that structural change was a central driver of the rise of protective laws, while rising female labor force participation was key to ending the protective era. In contrast, women's suffrage and the rise of skilledlabor played more modest roles.
The seminar will be in presence, Seminar Room 2104, Building U7-2nd floor